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II.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee recognizes this Court's power to hear the appeal
on the issue of permanent alimony pursuant to 78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah
Code, but challenges this Court's jurisdiction, as hereinafter
argued, to hear the issue of temporary alimony.
III.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.

Whether this Court can consider Plaintiff's attempt

to appeal the Court's denial to her of temporary alimony in its
order of September 30, 1991, where
1)

No appeal was taken from the order pursuant to Rules

3 and/or 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure;
2)

No permission was sought or granted to appeal the

order under the provisions of Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, relating to interlocutory order; and
3)

No attempt was made on the part of Plaintiff to

preserve the issue of the denial of temporary alimony.
iii

Standard of Appellate Review:
Error in Law
Authority:
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
B.

Whether

the

Court

erred

in denying

Plaintiff's

Petition to Modify to increase alimony.
Standard of Appellate Review;
Abuse of Discretion
Authority:
Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Ut. App. 1991)
Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 (1992)
English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977)
Harding v. Harding, Utah, 488 P.2d 308 (1971)
Paffel v. Paffel, Utah, 48 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1986)
Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Ut. App. 1989)
Walker v. Walker, Utah, 707 P.2d 110 (1985)
Watson v. Watson, 194 Ut Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut. App. 1992)

iv

C.

Whether

the

Court

erred

in

refusing

to

award

Plaintiff attorney fees.
Standard of Appellate Review:
Abuse of Discretion
Authority;
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Ut. App. 1991)
Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Ut. Adv. Rep. 49 (Ut. App.
1992)
Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Ut. App. 1988)
IV.
STATUTES AND RULES
1.

Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code:

(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties,, the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property and obligations
for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
2.

Rules 3, 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
See addendum

v

V.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings Below and

Disposition.
Plaintiff appeals the order of the order of the Honorable
David S. Young of March 3, 1992, denying Plaintiff's PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE dated August 22, 1991. Plaintiff
also purports to appeal this Court's ORDER ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
ALIMONY dated September 30, 1991, which resulted in the Court's
denial to Plaintiff of her motion for temporary alimony.
The instant petition was originally filed on August 22,
1991,

and

later

amended

by

Plaintiff's

AMENDED

PEITION

FOR

MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE, filed on January 13, 1992, wherein
Plaintiff asked for the following relief insofar as alimony is
concerned:
A. For an order granting alimony to plaintiff
in a reasonable amount per month until
plaintiff is able to meet her current monthly
expenses without such an award; . . . (R. 306,
fA)
The matter was heard at trial on February 11, 1992.
Plaintiff testified on her own behalf and offered the testimony of
1

two "friendly" witnesses. Thereafter Plaintiff called Defendant as
an adverse witness and rested. (R. , 488)

At the conclusion of

Plaintiff's case in chief Defendant moved to dismiss, which motion
was granted by the Court.

(R. , 492)

At no time thereafter did

Plaintiff move to amend pleadings, re-open the case to offer
additional testimony or seek any relief from the Court of any
nature whatsoever.

The instant appeal followed the entry of this

Court's ORDER DISMISSING PETITION TO MODIFY on March 3, 1992.
2.
1.

Statement of Facts.
These parties were divorced by DECREE OF DIVORCE

entered in this Court on November 29, 1982. Plaintiff was awarded
under that decree alimony in the amount of $1.00 per year.

(R,

133)
2.

The Court made no findings regarding the reason for

granting alimony in the original decree.

Indeed, the decree, save

the issue of custody of Mark Wells, was entered into pursuant to
stipulation.
3.

(R, 129)
The

Decree

of

Divorce

also

had

provided

that

Defendant was granted a lien on the parties' marital residence of
$15,000.00, payable when the house was sold, within 6 months of the
2

youngest child's reaching 18 or within 6 month's of Plaintiff's
remarriage or cohabitation. (R, 134-135)
4.

This $15,000.00 lien in Defendant's favor was never

paid and was bankrupted by Plaintiff.

(R, 350, 54-6; and R, 357-8,

f2-3)
5.

Plaintiff's first attempt to increase the alimony

award came on June 17, 1989, when she filed a VERIFIED PETITION FOR
MODIFICATION OF DECREE OF DIVORCE, in which she requested, inter
alia, that [t}he court should increase the alimony ordered to be
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to a minimum of $1,500.00 per
month."

(R., 246, f (b))
6.

Defendant

answered,

denying

the

material

allegations, and counterclaimed for a change in custody and other
relief.

(R., 250-255)
7.

Defendant sought in his AMENDED COUNTER-PETITION TO

MODIFY DECREE OF DIVORCE dated April 18, 1990 to secure payment of
the $15,000.00 lien (R, 272-277). Although the Court did not allow
the actual filing of the amended counter-petition, it did recognize
that the factual bases presented therein could be considered.
291)
3

(R,

8.

Plaintiff's June 17, 1989 Petition and Defendant's

Counter-petition were resolved by stipulation on August, 9, 1990,
and the Court thereafter entered its ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF
DIVORCE AND ON PENDING MATTERS dated November 1, 1990•
that stipulation
dismissed,

Plaintiff's petition to increase alimony was

(R., 303, f 5)

payment of the $15,000 lien.
9.
22,

Pursuant to

as were Defendant's claims to secure
(R., 302)

The instant petition was originally filed on August,

1991, but was amended

in the form of Plaintiff's AMENDED

PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREE dated January 13, 1992.
The latter sought, consistently with the former, the following
relief insofar as the question of alimony is concerned:
A. For an order granting alimony to plaintiff
in a reasonable amount per month until
plaintiff is able to meet her current monthly
expenses without such an award; . . . (R. ,
3 06, f A) [emphasis added]
10.

At the time of the trial on February 11, 1992,

Defendant sought the Court's ruling that the issue of alimony was
res judicata prior to November 1, 1990, the date of the order
denying the June 17, 1989 petition to raise alimony (R., 441-443)

4

but the Court denied the motion without prejudice (R. , 444) and
never specifically ruled on the issue.
11.

In any event, the evidence before the Court on

February 11, 1992 relevant to the requirements of Schindler v.
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah App., 1989), discussed in detail below
at pages 17-19, is outlined as follows:
a)

Plaintiff, at the time of the trial, was employed

and making $3,000.00 per month.
b)

(R, 439)

Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the Decree

of Divorce in early 1983 was approximately $11,000.00 per year.
(R, 441)
c)

At the trial on February 11, 1992, Plaintiff also

testified that Defendant was making $42,000 to $43,000.00 per year
at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered,

(R., 445)

which

testimony was uncontroverted in that Defendant did not remember his
salary at that time.
d)

(R., 487)

Defendant's income at the time of the trial on

February 11, 1992 was $5,600 per month, or $67,200 yearly.
486)

5

(R. ,

e)

Plaintiff was employed at Becton-Dickenson from 1980

to 1984. (R, 445-446)
f)

After

approximately

two

months

unemployment,

Plaintiff found a job with Wicat Systems in Orem, Utah. (R, 446447)
g)

In February of 1985, Plaintiff took employment with

her Hercules Aerospace in Magna, Utah, which employment lasted
until December, 1986 (R, 447)
h)

In February, 1987, Plaintiff secured employment with

Morton-Thiokol, which lasted until June of 1990.
i)
Morton-Thiokol.
j)

(R, 448)

Plaintiff voluntarily terminated her employment at
(R, 453)
Plaintiff

then

took

employment

with

Futura

Industries at $40,000.00 per year on June 29, 1990, the day after
she left Morton-Thiokol.
k)

Plaintiff

(R, 454)
lost her

job at Futura

Industries on

September 10 [1990], over allegations of sexual harassment and
Plaintiff's suit against them with the UEOC.

6

(R, 4 54)

1)
employment

at

Beginning
Edo

in

January,

Corporation

at

$36,000.00

employment lasted until May 24, 1991.
m)

1991,

Plaintiff

secured

per year.

This

(R, 454-455)

Plaintiff received unemployment compensation from

the time of her termination at Edo

Corporation until January 20,

1992, when Plaintiff became employed at her present employment.
(R, 455-456)
n)

During the period of Plaintiff's unemployment before

her present employment, she received over $6,000.00 in unemployment
benefits, along with approximately
payments from Defendant.
o)

$4,500.00

in child

support

(R, 471-472)

Plaintiff had fallen behind in her obligations as a

result of her unemployment, prior to finding her present job.

(R.,

457-460)
12.

At the conclusion of the evidence the Court then

made the following findings:
All right. I have reviewed the facts that you
present, Mr. Hanks, and the - I think the
court would be obligated to find that there
has been a change in circumstance just simply
by the fact of unemployment and in reemployment and those kinds of events occurring
in Ms. Wells1 life, but at the same time I do
believe that there is no establishment of
7

sufficient evidence to justify a change in
requiring alimony be paid.
In fact, it strikes me that under the
circumstances of this case both of these
parties are uniquely able to earn substantial
amounts of money to meet their needs and
obligations.
Her
employment
has
been
$40,000.00, is now $30,000.00.
There are
decisions associated with that employment that
she must make as to whether she is going to
reside in Utah, in Layton, or whether she is
going to move to Idaho Falls where the
job
is, her
family, her circumstances, her
children, justify the move to Idaho Falls.
The determination to leave the job because she
was dissatisfied with the travel challenges,
those are all decisions that everybody has to
make in the normal course of their life.
I don't see that the circumstances of this
case could establish a sufficient basis for
the court to conclude that I ought to do
anything with the alimony.
As a matter of
fact, I have some basic concerns about the
protection of the one-year, or the one dollar
per year provision under the circumstances of
this case because both parties are able-bodied
persons and able to earn income. . . .
So based upon the testimony that I have heard,
the presentations that have been presented
here, the court finds that the petition to
modify should be and the same is hereby
denied. (R, 60-62)
13.

The court, upon further questioning on the part of

Plaintiff's attorney, made an additional finding as follows:
8

. . . the circumstances of the fact that she
has been unable to develop seniority, those
circumstances are no different than an awful
lot of other people.
She now has the
opportunity to be employed at $30,000.00 a
year, and that's more substantial
than
probably 60 percent of our population, if not
more, and that, to me, is adequate income to
meet her needs.
14. Contrary to Plaintiff's representations, Judge Young
never specifically ruled that there was a "substantial" change in
circumstances shown by Plaintiff, although he did acknowledge a
"change."

(R., 490)

In view of the result, however, that is a

moot point.
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

Plaintiff cannot appeal the denial of her request

for temporary alimony pendente lite of September 30, 1991, in that
Plaintiff has failed to follow the appellate procedure of Rules 3,
4 and 5 by failing to appeal the order as a final order; by failing
to seek the Appellate Court's approval by appealing the order as an
interlocutory

order; and by failing to preserve the issue of

temporary alimony for later appeal.

9

2.
alimony,

the

With regard to Plaintiff's petition to
Court

is vested with

broad

discretion,

increase
and

the

findings and conclusions of the trial court are presumed to be
correct, unless appellant can show a clear abuse of discretion.
The trial Court has considered the three Schindler factors as
required by law and concluded that Plaintiff
an increase in alimony.

was not entitled to

Given the consideration of those factors,

the Court's conclusion that Plaintiff was not entitled

to an

increase in alimony is well within the Court's discretion, and does
not constitute an abuse thereof.
VII.
ARGUMENT
1. PLAINTIFF'S ATTEMPT TO APPEAL THE DENIAL OF TEMPORARY
ALIMONY IS IMPROPER.
Plaintiff identifies as an issue on appeal the Court's
denial of PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION FOR TEMPORARY CHILD SUPPORT
AND ALIMONY, filed August 22, 1991.

(R, 315-318)

It is undisputed

that the Court denied the motion for temporary alimony in its ORDER
ON MOTION FOR TEMPORARY ALIMONY, signed and entered on September
30, 1991. (R, 361-362)

As the following discussion will show,
10

Plaintiff failed to take the appropriate actions to preserve or
appeal that order, and cannot now present that issue to this Court.
Rule

3,

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure

(URAP),

provides the circumstances under which an appeal may be taken from
a trial court as follows:
An appeal may be taken from a district . . .
court to the appellate court with jurisdiction
over the appeal from all final orders and
judgments . . . by filing a notice of appeal
with the clerk of the trial court within the
time allowed by Rule 4. [emphasis added]
Rule 4, URAP, provides in pertinent part that
[i]n a case in which an appeal is permitted as
a matter of right from the trial court to the
appellate court, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial court within 3 0 days after the entry of
the judgment or order appealed from.
Rule 4(e) URAP provides that the trial court may extend
the time within which an appeal may be filed, but no motion for
extension has been filed in this case, and the provisions of 4(e)
are therefore inapplicable.
There may be an issue of whether or not the order denying
the motion for temporary alimony is a "final order."

A judgment

which is "final" for purposes of an appeal has been held to be an
11

order "that ends the controversy between the parties litigant."
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Lavton, Utah, 600 P.2d 538 (1979)
Kessimakias v. Kessimakias. Utah, 546 P. 2d 888 (1976).

See also

Clearly the

September 30, 1991 order ended the controversy of alimony pendente
lite, and is arguably final in that sense.

However, even if the

September 30, 1991 order is interlocutory in nature, it cannot now
be presented on appeal, as is discussed below.
The rules relating to interlocutory orders differ from
those relating to final judgment, and are reflected in Rule 5, URAP
as follows:
5(a)
An appeal from an interlocutory order
may be sought by any party by filing a
petition for permission to appeal from the
interlocutory order with the clerk of the
appellate court with jurisdiction over the
case within 20 days after the entry of the
order of the trial court, with proof service
on all other parties to the action.
Rule 5 then goes on to specify the requirements of the
content of the petition and other requirements.
undisputed

that

Plaintiff

did

not

petition

this

It is again
Court

permission to appeal the order denying temporary alimony.

for

Neither

did Plaintiff seek to preserve as error the denial of the motion

12

for temporary alimony,
appeal that order.

as would otherwise be necessary to now

Haslam v. Paulsen, Utah, 389 P.2d 736 (1964).

Accordingly, the Court does not have to determine whether
or not the order denying alimony was final or temporary, since
Plaintiff has not complied with either Rule 3 or 5, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Neither has Plaintiff sought to preserve as

error the denial of temporary alimony, and this Court, for that
reason, lacks jurisdiction over the question of temporary alimony.
2.

THE COURT'S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY

WAS PROPER.
A.

Plaintiff's

Petition

to

Modify

Requests

only

Temporary Alimony.
Plaintiff's AMENDED PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF DECREE
OF DIVORCE dated January 13, 1992, alleges, inter alia, that
Plaintiff " . . . has recently been laid off
from her job as a result of a work force
reduction [and that as a result] she has
indefinitely lost the means to adequately
support herself and provide adequate support
and care for the minor child in her custody,
Craig Wells." (R, 402)

13

The prayer of the Amended Petition specifically asks to
modify the Decree of Divorce, but insofar as alimony is concerned,
only
. until Plaintiff is able to meet her
current monthly expenses without such an award
[•]
It is undisputed that Plaintiff made no motions pursuant
to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend his pleadings
at the time of trial, or thereafter, for that matter.

Other than

amendment as a matter of right, which decidedly does not apply
here, Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
[o]therwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party; . . •
It

is

recognized

that

Rule

15(a)

gives

the

court

discretion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence
presented at trial, but no motions were made and no orders uttered
to allow such amendment. Clearly, then, Plaintiff was only seeking
alimony on a temporary basis.
B. The Court's Action in Denying Plaintifffs Petition to
Modify was not an Abuse of Discretion.

14

Plaintiff's brief on appeal is devoid of any criticism of
the Court's findings or their adequacy.

Plaintiff's position is,

rather, that the Court's conclusion was an abuse of its discretion.
Defendant wishes to make the point that the Court's conclusion and
findings come clothed with the presumption of validity, which
presumption of validity must guide this Court in its review of the
trial court's actions.
The trial Court's discretion is very broad, and that
discretion clearly extends to issues relating to modifications, as
this case is. Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Ut.App.,
1990)

Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has stated in Harding v.

Harding. Utah, 488 P.2d 308, 310 (1971) as follows:
[The trial court's] actions are indulged with
a presumption of validity and correctness and
the burden is upon the appellant to show a
basis for upsetting them: either (1) that
findings have been made when the evidence
clearly preponderates the other way; [citation
omitted] or (2) that there has been a
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error; [citation omitted] or (3) that it
appears plainly that there has been such an
abuse of discretion that an inequity or
injustice has resulted, [citation omitted]

15

The Utah Supreme Court case of Paf fel v. Paf fel, Utah,
732 P.2d 96 (1986) provides further insight into the standards
required of the trial judge.

Appellant in that case had argued

that since the trial court had failed to make findings
".
. . concerning respondent's
income,
expenses, or need for support . . . ,"
that such was reversible error.

At 102, the Court cited with

approval the previous case of Walker v. Walker, Utah, 707 P.2d 110
(1985) and found that
[a]s in Walker, the evidence in this case
supports
the
lower
court's
order,
and
appellant has made no showing to rebut the
presumption that the trial court did consider
respondent's income, expenses, and need for
support.
The Paffel decision has been cited more recently in the
case of Chambers v. Chambers, Utah App., 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
(1992), where the court at 49, relying partly upon the Paffel case,
stated as follows:
The
trial
court
is given
considerable
discretion to provide for spousal support, and
such an award will not be overturned on appeal
unless there has been a clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion, [citations omitted]

16

The Chambers court also provided the following insight
into alimony questions.

At 49 the Court stated as follows:

In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah
App. 1989) , we outlined the factors to be
considered by a trial court in determining
alimony:
"(1) the financial conditions and
needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability
of the
receiving
spouse to produce a
sufficient income for him or herself; and (3)
the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support."
[citations omitted in
original] "If these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb a trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion."
[citations omitted in
original]
In the case of Watson v. Watson, Utah App., 194 Ut. Adv.
Rep. 42 (1992) , the trial court had made the finding that Mrs.
Watson, by agreement of the parties, had not worked outside the
home and calculated Mr. Watson's income from five years of income
tax returns.

The court then made the following finding:

Based upon [Mr. Watson's] ability to earn, and
the needs of [Mrs. Watson], . . .
The appeals court, at 43, found as follows:
The trial court's written findings demonstrate
that the court considered the factors set out
in Schindler, and those findings are supported
by the evidence. Therefore, we conclude that
17

the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in determining the alimony award.
A

review

of

this

record

adequately

supports

the

conclusion that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Plaintiff's petition for modification.

The evidence on the record

presented

11,

to

the

Court

on

February

1992

is

really

not

controverted.

It is only the application of fact to law that is

controverted.

Furthermore, it is clear

all the Schindler factors.

that the Court considered

The Court listened to Plaintiff's

testimony regarding her financial condition and needs (R, 457-465)
and specifically in its findings referred to those circumstances
along

with

Plaintiff's

lifestyle

decisions.

(R,

490,

491)

Furthermore, he specifically considered the abilities of both of
these parties to earn

(R, 490-491), and after considering those

factors concluded that there was no basis to change alimony as
requested by Plaintiff.

There is no doubt that the Court also

considered the historical capabilities of the parties to earn
income, which is a legitimate consideration.

English v. English.

Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977)
Just because Plaintiff does not agree with the result
does not mean that the Court has abused its discretion.
18

It is

clear

that

the

Court

has

considered

the

three

elements

of

Schindler, and as the Chambers case at 49 stated, as long as
these three factors have been
considered, we will not disturb the trial
court's alimony award unless such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion. [citations omitted]
Such an abuse of discretion has not and cannot be shown
here, and the trial Court's judgment must be affirmed by this Court
in all particulars.
VIII.
THE COURT'S DENIAL OP ATTORNEY FEES TO
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
The determination of whether or not to grant attorney
fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and cannot
be

overturned

discretion.

on

appeal

except

in the

case

of

an

abuse

of

Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Ut. Adv. Rep. 49, 50 (1992);

Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Ut. App., 1991).
An award of attorney fees, according to Chambers
must be based on evidence of the
reasonableness of the requested fees, as well
as the financial need of the receiving spouse,
and the ability of the other spouse to pay.
[citing] Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331,
1337 (Ut. App., 1988)
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The Court, in the consideration of the issues required by
Schindler addressed above, also considered the relative abilities
of the parties, having found as follows:
In fact, it strikes me that under the
circumstances of this case both of these
parties are uniquely able to earn substantial
amounts of money to meet their needs and
obligations. (R, 490-491)
Accordingly, the Court in addition made the following
finding:
I further find that each party should be
ordered to pay their own individual attorney's
fees and costs as they've incurred them. (R,
492)
Again, the Court's action is clothed with a presumption
of validity, and cannot be overturned on appeal except upon a
showing of an abusive discretion.

Such showing has not and cannot

be made, and the trial court's ruling on the issue of attorney fees
must be upheld.
IX.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing argument clearly shows that Plaintiff has
no right to appeal the Court's earlier denial of temporary alimony.
The September 30, 1991 order has not been appealed, either as a
20

final judgment or as an interlocutory order, and Plaintiff
preserved

the issue to appeal presently.

has not

Accordingly,

it is

inevitable that this Court lacks jurisdiction to second-guess the
trial court's denial of temporary alimony.
As far as the issue of a change in permanent alimony is
concerned, Appellee does not believe that Appellant has carried her
burden in any respect.

Appellee disagrees that the Court found a

substantial change in circumstances, although it did recognize a
"change."

Even

if

the

Court's

conclusion

is

construed

to

constitute a "substantial change" of circumstances, the Court's
ultimate conclusion was that an increase of alimony to Plaintiff
was

not warranted.

Given that conclusion, Plaintiff's only

argument is that the Court abused its discretion.
A

review

of

the

case

authorities

set

forth

above

recognizes that the trial court's discretion in matters of alimony,
and

including

modifications

of alimony,

is very

broad.

The

Appellate Court will not overturn the trial court's ruling unless
Appellant can show an abuse of that discretion, and Defendant
argues herein that Plaintiff has been unable to show such an abuse
of

discretion.

Defendant

has
21

demonstrated

in the

foregoing

argument that the Court has considered the three factors set forth
in the Schindler case, and that the Court's conclusion not to allow
an increase in alimony was not an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff has not really attacked the findings of the
Court in this appeal, and for that reason Defendant has not sought
to discuss the requirement that Plaintiff would otherwise have of
marshalling the evidence.

However, Defendant has

demonstrated

that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are clothed
with a presumption of validity unless and until Appellant can
overcome that presumption by a clear showing that the Court abused
its discretion.

Plaintiff has failed in that endeavor in the

opinion of Defendant, and the appeal must be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I T — day of January, 1993.

^ E T E R W. G U Y O N / 7
/
Attorney for Defendant and
Appellee David J. Wells
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE werejmailed, first-class postage
prepaid, to the following on this / x ^ day of January, 1993:
James B. Hanks, Esq.
Western Financial Ctr., Ste. 300
376 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Rules 3, 4 and 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
TITLE I

43. Certification by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court
44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals.

APPLICABILITY OF RULES

TITLE VII.

RULE

1. Scope of rules.
2. Suspension of rules
TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS
OF TRIAL COURTS

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Appeal as of right, how taken
Appeal as of right: when taken.
Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
Bond for costs on appeal.
Security: Proceedings against sureties.
Stay or injunction pending appeal.
Docketing statement.
Motion for summary disposition.
The record on appeal.
Transmission of the record.
Notice of filing by clerk of appellate court.

JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO COURT OF APPEALS

45. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of Court
of Appeals.
46. Considerations governing review of certiorari.
47. Certification and transmission of record; filing;
parties.
48. Time for petitioning.
49. Petition for writ of certiorari.
50. Brief in opposition; reply brief; brief of amicus
curiae.
51. Disposition of petition for writ of certiorari.
FORMS

TITLE I. A P P L I C A B I L I T Y O F R U L E S .

R u l e 1. S c o p e of rules.
(a) Applicability of r u l e s . These rules govern the
TITLE III. REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS
procedure before the Supreme Court and the Court of
OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMISSIONS,
Appeals of Utah in all cases. Applicability of these
AND COMMITTEES
rules to the review of decisions or orders of adminis14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; trative agencies is governed by Rule 18. When these
rules provide for a motion or application to be made
intervention
in a district, juvenile, or circuit court or an administrative agency, commission, or board, the procedure
16. Filing of the record.
for making such ^motion or application shall be gov1 7 / S t a y pending review.
erned by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah
18. "Applicability of other rules to review.
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the rules of practice
of the trial court, administrative agency, commission,
TITLE IV. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS; HABEAS CORPUS
or board.
19. Extraordinary writs.
(b) R e f e r e n c e £o " c o u r t . " Except as provided in
20. Habeas corpus proceedings.
Rule 43, when these rules refer to a decision or action
by the court, the reference shall include a panel of the
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
court. The term "trial court" means the court or tribu21. Filing and service.
nal from which the appeal is taken. The term "appel22. Computation and enlargement of time.
late court" means the court to which the appeal is
23. Motions.
taken.
24. Briefs.
(c) P r o c e d u r e e s t a b l i s h e d b y s t a t u t e . If a proce25. Brief of an amicus curiae or guardian ad litem. dure is provided by state statute as to the appeal or
26. Filing and service of briefs.
review of an order of an administrative agency, com27. Form of briefs.
mission, board, or officer of the state which is incon28. Prehearing conference.
sistent with one or more of these rules, the statute
shall govern. In other respects, these rules shall ap29. Oral argument.
30. Decision of the court: dismissal, notice of deci- ply to such appeals or reviews.
sion.
(d) Rules not to affect j u r i s d i c t i o n . These rules
31. Expedited appeals decided after oral argument
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals as
without written opinion
established by law.
32. Interest on judgment
(e) Title. These rules shall be known as the Utah
33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
Rules of Appellate Procedure and abbreviated Utah
of attorney's fees.
R. App. P.
34. Award of costs.
Sd. fkti'tiba &r re&eanhg.
Rule 2. Suspension
of rules.
36. Issuance of remittitur.
] In the interest of expediting a decision, the appel37. Suggestion of mootness; voluntary dismissal.
late court, on its own motion or for extraordinary
38. Substitution of parties.
tause shown, may, except as to the provisions of
39. Duties of the clerk.
(Rules 4(a), 4(b), 4(e), 5(a), and 48, suspend the re40. Attorney's or party's certificate; sanctions and
quirements or provisions of any of these rules in a
discipline.
(particular case and may order proceedings in that
:ase in accordance with its direction.
TITLE VI. CERTIFICATION AND TRANSFER
BETWEEN COURTS

41. Certification of questions of law by United States
courts.
42. Transfer of case from Supreme Court to Court of

Appeals.

TITLE II. APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS
A N D ORDERS OF TRIAL COURTS.
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: h o w taken.
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be taken from a district, juve-
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nile, or circuit court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law, by filing
a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court
within the time allowed by Rule 4. tFailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing
of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the
appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include
dismissal of the appeal or other sanctions short of
dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees.
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more
parties are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make joinder
practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or
may join in an appeal of another party after filing
separate timely notices of appeal. Joint appeals may
proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant.
Individual appeals may be consolidated by order of
the appellate court upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the
separate appeals.
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the
appeal shall be known as the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the
appeal, except where otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appellate
court, the party making the original application shall
be known as the petitioner and any other party as the
respondent.
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or part
thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from
which the appeal is taken; and shall designate the
court to 4which the appeal is taken
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking
the appeal shall give notice of the filing of a notice of
appeal by'serving personally"or mailing a copy
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the party is not represented by
counsel, then on the party at the party's last known
address.
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals.
At the time of filing any notice of separate, joint, or
cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing
fees as are established by law, and also the fee for
docketing the appeal in the appellate court. The clerk
of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal
unless the filing and docketing fees are paid.
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the
notice of appeal and payment of the required fees, the
clerk of the trial 'court shall immediately transmit
one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of
its filing, together with the docketing fee, to the clerk
of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the copy of the
notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the
appellate court • shall enter »the appeal upon the
docket. An appeal shall be docketed under the title
given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identified as .such, but if the title does not contain the name of,the appellant, such name shall be
added to the title.

Rule 5

date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a
statutory forcible entry or unlawful detainer action,
the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after
the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
from
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely
motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is *
filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment
under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or
make additional findings of fact, whether or not an
alteration of the judgment would be required if the
motion is granted, (3) under Rule 59 to alter or
amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new
trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from
the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion Similarly, if a
timely motion under the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an
order, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights
of a defendant, the time for appeal for all parties shall
runfromthe entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion A notice
of appeal filed before the disposition of any of the
above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court
disposing of the motion as provided above.
(c) Filing prior to entry*of judgment or order.
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule, a
notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of
the judgment or order of the trial court shall be
treated as filed after such entry and on the day
thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice
of appeal is filed by a party, any other party may file
a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within
the time otherwise prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule, whichever period last expires
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause,
may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) of this
rule. A motion filed before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court
otherwise requires. Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the
other parties in accordance with the rules of practice
of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days
past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of
entryt of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.

Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal
from an interlocutory order may be sought by any
party by filing a petition for permission to appeal
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdiction over the case within 20
days after the entry "of the order of the trial court,
with proof of service on all other parties to the action.
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
,'t(a) Appeal from final judgment and prder. In a, . (b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner
casein ^{richju^ appeal Jjs jttrmijbted as atmatter^of shall .file with*>theXlerk of the Supreme' Court an
right fromj^iijal c^j^ntojthe jappejlate,court,,the original aiid seven copies of the petition/or, ivith the<
Clerk of the Court* of 'Appeals^an original and four
the clerkjKw the Jnal c^urt within JO daysjafter^fee copies, together with the fee for iiling a notice of ap-t

Rule 6
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peal in the trial court and the docketing fee'in the
appellate court. If ah order is issued authorizing the
appeal, the clerk of the appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the respective
parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order^ together with a copy of the petition and filing fee,
to the trial court where the petition and order shall
be filed in lieu* of a" notice'of appeal. If the petition is
denied,t4the filing* fee shall be refunded. ,
^(c)" Content of petition. The petition shall con^w*^(lf AT statement of the facts necessary? to an
s>t
— understanding of the controlling question of law
f
^-determined by the order sought to be reviewed;
^ f j - ' (2)',A statement of the question 'of law'arid a
^ ; ' demmistraiion^that the * question was properly
|f^/raised^before 'the trial court ancl ruled upon;
"'li i.* :f(3) A statement of the reasons why an immedi'^^ate interlocutory appeal should be permitted; and
.vW^iv^l£ s&tement of the reason why the appeal
:
f, may ^materially advance' the termination of the
,} JJLitigationv , ,v, i/V;.-^ " ,,.,;-, ,>,v JlTr-[ - - -•• f; \0
If 'KifflThe petition shall include a copy of the or;!'. Ider of the .trial couVt from which an,appeal is
^ J ^sought and ,an^y" related findings of fact, conclude ^"sipns j)f Jaw and opinion. ^ ^ £-.^U:Jtwniv.r +n
^(d)( An^ver. ^Within 10 days after service of the
petition, any\.qtner party may file an answer in opposition or concurrence. An original and seven copies of
theanswershall be filed in .the Supreme Court. An
original and four'copies shall be filed iri the Court of
Appeals.'.The petition and any answer.shall be submitted without oral argument unless otherwise,ordered. ,l-;.,;l;/iuiv!}t;u^V.^i Ji'>-'^r:*-' p'ixyn*&'A 3-ft
-Xf(e) jPrant of permission. An appealfroman interlocutory Vrder may be granted only if it appears that
the order involves substantial rights'and may ihaterially affect the.finaldecision or that* a determination
of the con-ectness *of.the.'order* before final judgment
will betterserve* thei.administratioh and interests of
justice. The order permitting the appeal may set forth'
the particular issue or point of law which will be considered and may be on such temsj'including the filing of a'bond for costs and damages, as the appellate
court may 'determine. If the petition is granted, the
appeal shall be deemed to have been docketed by the
granting of the petition, and all proceedings subsequent to the granting of the petition shall be as, and
within the time required, for appeals from final judgments. :-..*,? .-••^-,-_vr^i .-- •».:..-..;..:-v.^ . •./Viv*. ..-:-..,_
Rule 6. Bond for costs on appeal, ^ i i*:^ V/$W
fExcept in/a^cruiunal case,4 at'the time "of filing the
notice of appeal,^the appellant Jshall file With ,the notice'*a 'bond for costs on appeal^uriless1 ihe bond isJ
waived in writing by the adverse party, or unless an
affidavit as provided for in Section 21-7-3, Utah Code
Ann: 1953 as amended, is nled.^h^Jxmd shall be in
tKe sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as
the|rial court may order on motion pf the appellee to,
e^jLU-e^ payment of costs"on appeal^ No separate bond.
for^cpsts^ on appeal is^ required ,whejv a supersedeas;
bond:isjTiled..^^Wndon a^
cient suretiesand .shall ,be conditioned to secure payr,
menjfqfcbstslf ; ^
m^n^affirmed; or of such/costs as the appellate coiiri
ina^ajyfudifthe'ju^girieiit is modified; The adverse^
partyjmay^except to thejsumciency :of the sureties mi
aa^aSctgi^
Rule^BMJiiaj
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Rule 7/Security: Proceedings against sureties.
Whenever these rules require or permit the'giving
of security by a party, and security is'given in the
form of a bond or stipulation or pother undertaking
with one or more sureties, each surety must consent
therein to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the
trial court and must irrevocably appoint the'clerk of
that court as an agent upon whom any papers affecting liability on the bond or undertaking rhay be
served. The sureties' liability may be enforced oh motion without the necessity of an independent action.
The hfiotioh' and such notice of the motion as Ihe trial
court prescribes "may be served on* the clerk "of the
trial court; who ;shall forthwith'* mail copies to the
sureties* if iheir addresses are* known. .-*? r^ir x' °

H^^mfe^^vpv^i ]?... y&?i%^$^rf: :
Rulefc8. Stay or injunction pen<dihg" appeal. "
5 J (ajStay must ordinarily be sought in *the first
instance in trial court; motion for stay in appellate court. Application for a stay of the judgment or
order of a trial court pending appeal, or disposition of
a petition under Rule 5, or for approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an order suspending/ modifying, restoring* or' granting ah injunction during the pendency of ah appeal must ordinarily be made in the
first iristancein the trial court. A inotiori for such
relief niay be'made to the appellate"court, but the
mbtionrshall show that application'to'the trial court
for the relief sought is not practicable,' or that the
trial court hiias denied an application, or has failed to
afford the relief which the applicant requested, with
the reasons'given by the trial court for its* action. The
motion/'shall als6vshow the reasons Tor ihe relief requested and the fa^ts relied upon, arid/if the^acts'are.
subject to dispute,'the motion shall be supported by "r
affidavits or other sworn statemenii o? cdpie? thereof.
With the motion shall be filed such'parts^of the jrecord
as^are^''ireieyaiii! Reasonable notice of .ihe^inquon shall
be given" to all parties'.' The motion shall bei'filed'witK
the,rclerk arid normally^will ^De^<ronsidefedi( by, the
cqiua, buVin 'exceptional cases wliere such procedure
would be impracticable due tq. thq requirements of
time, the application may be considered by a single
justice or judge of the court, v U;': t ,li^rt; tfc l- f
* .(b)' Stay may be conditioned upon giving of
bond. Relief available in the, appellate court under
this rule may be conditioned upon the,filing of a bond
or: other appropriate security Jn the trial, court.
:((c) Stays in criminal cases. Stays in criminal
cases pending ..appeal are governed by' Rule 27,
U.RCrim.P.,^ ,-Si f/;if^A::--%l'w KCU-LZ :*"! ; .- a"
Rule 9. Docketing statement, ^^{ffif">''•£> -ih
^.(a)v.fJ1mei for filing. VVithin 21 days after a notice
of. appeal,-cross-appeal, or a petition for,review is
file^, the t appellant, cross-appellant, ;or petitioner,
shall, file a docketing statement with ^the.. clerk of the
appellate court.. An original and seven -copies of thej
docketing statement shall be filed in the Supreme/
Court. An original and four copies shall,be filed in ther
Courjb^of,Appeals.^- %\l&-^vMb&^ffi&i* y£ rx*sfa>
AriCb) Purpose of docketing statement. The docket-^
ing statement is'not a brief and should not containf
arguments or procedural motions. ItHys juled by tKe
appellate court in assigning cases to;the Supreme
Court or to thei Ctfiirt of Appeals wlie^bolh^have ju-*j
~-^^---^*-4>—:±*--~:"^~^-*«^***-***tffl^**-e.:A_i-i: °

